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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an illustration of the difficulties in harmonising
European Member State legislation and explores the intricacies and
practicalities of successful decision-making in the  European Union [EU].
In the aftermath of the Single European Act [SEA], the beginnings of the
Single European Market [SEM] and the initiation of monetary union it
has become evident that financial service sectors need to involve themselves
in the creation of the EU. Through  a study of the discussions that
revolved around the creation of the Third  Life Assurance Directive this
paper investigates the extent of sector involvement in EU decision-making
and in doing so, analyses the utilisation of interest groups and
supranationality in the process of European regulation formulation.
Behaviour is ultimately a social matter . . . and thinking in terms of what
‘we’ should do, or what should be our strategy, may reflect a sense of
identity involving recognition of other people’s goals and the mutual
interdependencies involved [Sen, 1992; p 85].
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an overview of the workings of the EU decision-making
processes in the negotiations and formulation of the Third Life Assurance
Directive. In this context, the paper examines whether supranationalism is
apparent in EU institutions and the extent to which interest groups are used in
legislation formulation1.
Interest groups will be defined as non-governmental organisations that attempt
to have an influence on public-policy. They will be seen as entities that provide
an institutional linkage between sectors and government. ‘More specifically . . .
those types of organisations whose political task it is to reflect the interests of the
economic or occupational sections they represent’ [Lieber, 1974; p 29].
It designates those organisations which are occupied . . . in trying
to influence the policy of public bodies in their own chosen
direction. . . . European interest groups . . . are centrally organised
associations of interest groups . . . each of which represents either a
number of similar groupings or both national groupings and
European industry committee groupings [Kirchner, 1980; p 96].
Interest groups apply pressure. Consequently, the terms pressure and interest
group will be used inter-relatedly. Interest groups can either be of a sectional or
of a promotional nature. This paper will concentrate on the sectional interest
group category which usually represents the interests of a profession, producer
group, occupations or trade unions. In particular, we shall concentrate on the
sectional interests of the life insurance industry.
‘Wyn Grant has noted that the relationship between pressure groups and the
European Community has, so far, been a relatively neglected subject. In Britain,
there are very few general studies of groups trying to influence EC decision-
making’ [Mazey and Richardson, 1993; p 93]. ‘Direct lobbying of EC institutions
constitutes an important part of the decision-making process within the
Community and has the effect of increasing EC autonomy over the interests of
Member States. There has been a rapid expansion of such activities over the last
few years. However, although this phenomenon has attracted a lot of attention,
there is surprisingly little systematic research on the topic’ [Andersen and
Elliassen, 1991; p 173].
In the 1990s, following the Single European Act [SEA] and the Maastricht Treaty,
a number of research projects on European business interest groups were
undertaken. Mazey and Richardson [1993] undertook a number of empirical
studies but according to Grant [1995] and Kohler-Koch [1994] overall the
research picture was still opaque.
There is little consensus about the importance of different types of
interest groups, about the influence they can exert on the politics
and policies of the EC and the effect their activities have on the
development of the integration process [Kohler-Koch, 1994; p 166
cited in Grant, 1995; p 99].
However, the importance of interest groups in the European decision-making
process had been recognised, hence the time and effort that is now being exerted
on them.
Since the early 1980s . . . growing numbers of organised interests . .
. have come to recognise the increasing importance of European
Community legislation . . . It is no longer possible to understand
the policy process . . . without taking account of the shift in power
to Brussels [Mazey and Richardson, 1993; p 191].
In addition to a number of recent studies this paper undertakes an analysis of
this process [see Greenwood et al, 1992; Greenwood and Cram, 1996;
Greenwood, 1995; 1997; Howell, 1997; 1998; Mazey and Richardson, 1996;
McLaughlin et al, 1993; McLaughlin and Greenwood, 1995; McLaughlin, 1995].
Camerra-Rowe (1996) pointed out that different sectors can undertake different
strategies when it comes to lobbying European institutions. She considered that
the insurance and pharmaceutical sectors have well run interest group
representation at the EU level. While the likes of the biotechnological and
automobile sectors companies represent themselves directly at the EU level.
Direct lobbying more accurately indicates a company’s choices. However, this is
expensive and there is no certainty that the Commission or European Parliament
will listen to an individual company if its proposals are not similar to the EU’s or
the sectors objectives. But this does illustrate that on certain matters the concerns
of individual companies will be taken into consideration. “While the
Commission prefers dealing with associations, its officials have been relatively
open to lobbying by individual large firms. Thus, firms often have an incentive
to lobby directly . . . However, it is rare for a firm, even a large one, to rely on
one channel of representation” (ibid, p 6). This provides the basis for a number
of difficulties. Companies that lobby directly: undermine the role of interest
groups because the message they carry may not represent the whole sector; have
limited incentives to compromise their positions in the collective because they
are able to lobby themselves; force the association to reach consensus, this may
lead to the acceptance of the lowest common denominator and undermine the
effectiveness of the interest group.
Small and medium-size enterprises or companies that are incapable of lobbying
the EU directly extend the roles of the interest group. Members are coerced into
accepting sector compromises and they cannot use the interest group to pursue
private advantage. European interest groups “. . . therefore have greater
flexibility in the types of positions they take . . . it means that the association has
greater political weight because it can claim to speak on behalf of all members”
(Camerra-Rowe, 1996; pp 6-8). Of course, the other extreme is where the interest
group is so diverse in its membership that agreement can never be reached.
The European insurance sector is mainly made up of small and medium-size
enterprises and with the exception of Allianz, lack the political weight and
resources to undertake direct action in Brussels. As a result, both national and
European interest groups have a greater influence on the Commission and their
membership. Companies need to accept the interest group's “. . . policy position
even if it does not take account of their particular interests because they cannot
effectively represent their own views. As a result, and paradoxically, the more
fragmented insurance sector was better able to undertake collective activity in
pursuing Community policy” (ibid, p 21).
As noted above, the SEA has created an impetus for the use of interest groups.
With Qualified Majority Voting [QMV] and the SEM programme, lobbying in
Brussels became imperative. ‘However, as several groups discovered to their
cost, lobbying in the European Community is far from a simple matter’ [ibid]. In
Europe the process of lobbying is far from a ‘cloak and dagger’ scenario, it is
quite the opposite. In Brussels lobbying  is open, uncertain and unpredictable.
‘Thus, in order to be effective Euro-lobbyists, groups must be able to co-ordinate
their national and EC level strategies, construct alliances with their European
counterparts, and monitor changing national and EC policy agendas’ [ibid, pp
191-192]. In this paper we examine the initial discussions regarding the
legislation and regulatory regimes that should be pursued to create the market
most amenable to all Member State life insurance industries. And how effective
interest groups were in the creation of legislation and the consequent regulatory
environments.
A SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET IN LIFE INSURANCE
The discussions about a single market in life insurance began in earnest between
1987 and 1988, and it was at this time, that interplay between the different
elements of the decision-making apparatus became clearer. A greater emphasis
was put on creating a Single European Market [SEM] in financial services
because of the political impetus given by the SEA. This indicated a streamlined
decision-making process which necessitated compromise and interaction
between the Member States on most issues.
The starting point was the realisation that regulation differences were the main
factors undermining the creation of a SEM in insurance. With regard to this, the
Commission considered that its main objective was to create co-ordinated
insurance supervision throughout the EU. Little work needed to be done on
reinsurance because Member State legislation and regulatory structures in this
area were relatively compatible. However, at the other end of the spectrum,
. . . divisions appeared most marked in life insurance, where
national ideas on consumer protection, the promotion of the
economy, currency protection, social objectives and taxation were
combined with different attitudes to composite insurers and even
divergent conceptions on the scope of life insurance itself . . . for
this reason . . . life insurance has been left until last at each
subsequent stage [Pool, 1992; p 179].
It is the responsibility of  the Commission and the European Parliament to
pursue the tenets of the treaties and bring to the formulation of legislation ideas
of their own. To enable this there needs to be an interaction between the life
insurance industry [in European and national terms] and the Commission.
However, there are differences between the Commission, the European
Parliament, the European life insurance industry and among the separate
Member State insurance industries. This is because of the national perspectives
of what insurance is and how the industry should be governed. Hence the need
for interest groups and concerted lobbying.
LIFE INSURANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEREST GROUPS
Pool [1992] considered that ‘. . . insurers are certainly much better organised as a
pressure group than the other players in the insurance markets. Even they,
however, have not always found it easy to arrive at a common perception of
what a common market should mean for them’ [p 11]. There are two main
insurance interest groups at the EU level. The Comité Européen des Assurances
[CEA] and the Bureau International des Producteurs D’Assurances et de
Réassurances [BIPAR] both have act on behalf of their membership at the
European level. There are also Member State national interest groups that are
affiliated to the CEA and BIPAR.
It has been argued that the main objectives of European interest groups are two-
fold. Firstly, they should ‘. . . promote the exchange of information and try to
find common denominators [consolidate strength]’ [Kirchner, 1980; p 109]. And
secondly, ‘co-ordinate and exert pressure for adopted policies through the
European organisations and the national affiliatiations on both the EC and the
national government’ [ibid].
European interest groups attempt to keep their membership informed about
developments in the sector and on EU activities. They achieve this through
holding seminars and conferences on important issues. Essentially, they try to ‘. .
. instil a spirit of co-operation and cohesion into their affiliates’ [ibid p 110]. In
this context, interest groups enable a means of integrating ideas, creating
compromise and interacting with a supranational body. They act as a catalyst in
the transferral of allegiances by national actors away from the national to the
European decision-making arena. The supranational entity in this context  is the
European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.
Haas presented the European dimension as one where,
. . . political integration is the process whereby political actors in
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states [Haas, 1958; p 16].
This is the shift toward a supranational decision-making entity. It is in this
context that this paper questions the formulation of the third life assurance
directive and the actions of those involved in its creation.
In 1995, the Director General of the Association of Brithish Insurers [ABI] asked
whether or not the Single European Market had arrived for insuarance and if
interest groups and legislators could ‘. . . sit back and let insurance companies
get on with putting the new freedoms to practical use’ [Boleat, 1995; p 45]. His
answer to this was ‘no’: the industry needed to remain diligent because
insurance is a complex financial service and has the potential to impact on many
parts of our existence. To this extent, many proposed directives would have
implications for the industry which should consequently ‘. . . influence the
debate . . . be aware of new proposals and . . . submit their views at an early
stage so that the implications can be properly considered and any necessary
changes made before the proposals become set in stone’ [ibid].
‘Commerce, which has enriched English citizens, has helped to make them free,
and this freedom in its turn has extended Commerce, and that has made the
greatness of the nation’ [Voltaire, 1980; p 51]. Frangoulis [1988] points out that
such a heritage is still apparent and for the
. . . British insurer freedom is the ‘zero option’, meaning minimum
interference with market forces in a capitalist society and the right
of free choice for the buyer. Without free choice, commerce cannot
be extended, whether within or outside the Community [ibid p 1].
He considered that the most difficult element in creating a single market in life
insurance ‘. . . is the existing differences in supervisory regimes’ [ibid, p 2].
However, it was recognised by the CEA that differences ‘. . . in the supervisory
practices of Member States could lead to distortion of competition between
insurance undertakings. Harmonisation of supervisory methods therefore
appears necessary’ [CEA Working Paper, 1990; p 4].
In 1988, Frangoulis indicated that over the first four to five years there would be
little change. Initially, ‘. . . buyers, brokers, carriers of insurance, will have some
difficulty in coming to terms with the rules of the game’  [ibid p 6]. This is
because ‘. . . the structure of future programmes of insurance will call for a
totally new approach in terms of comparability of cost, contract terms, quality of
security etc. These things take time’ [ibid, p 7]. Indeed, there will be difficulties
for insurers when they attempt to formulate new strategies as new regulations
are bound to affect operations. It was felt that this would also be the case for UK
insurers and that they would need to revisit their tactical and strategical
operations in a post-1992 environment.
Initially, it was thought necessary to revisit the accepted division between home
and overseas markets; that companies are not interested in offering cross-border
services because they are designed to operate through establishments: this leaves
a large hole in the corporate structure. ‘The market place is not there to
accommodate insurers, it is the insurers who should fit the market’ [ibid].
Additionally, new skills would be necessary to enable market penetration i.e. the
EU markets would need to be understood.
O’Leary2 [1988] drew attention to the feelings of many UK insurers and their
inability to take the SEM as seriously as their continental counterparts. His hope
was that such would not continue to be the case as change is continual in the
creation of the SEM and it was crucial that the UK had an input into the
formulation of the market. He recognised that in each Member State the two
main areas legislation was concerned with were consumer protection and
limitation of policy-holder risk. ‘However, the way in which this is done differs
from country to country’ [ibid, p 1]. For instance, in the UK, companies were
allowed a large amount of freedom in relation to some of their EU counterparts.
In other Member States, this was not the position. Instead, the regulatory
structure was much tighter.
O’Leary considered that there were a number of problematic differences
between the UK and more prescribed Member States with regard to legislation
covering the Third Life Assurance Directive. These included problems with
uniform premium rates: this is where the supervisory authority indicate the
bases to be used in premium calculations so creating nearly identical premium
rates across the product. The UK does not have these restrictions. Secondly, he
pointed out that in most Member States the authorities also control policy
conditions and this has undermined the adaptability and range of products.
Thirdly, in a number of Member States, the authorities indicate the extent of the
companies’ investment policies. In each of these areas, the UK has less regulation
and in most cases no such restriction. Consequently, for a free market to be
established, a harmonisation process has to be undertaken. Other difficulties that
were being dealt with at the time [1988] included a uniform approach to
reserving and the transmission of premiums from one Member State to another.
Additionally, insurance contracts were problematic, an area which remains
difficult3 .
In the field of insurance services, the concept of the general good has come to play
an important role. This is so, ‘. . . first of all, because Community insurance
directives regulate only partially cross-border insurance activities, and leave
room for Member State regulation. Secondly, these insurance directives refer
explicitly to the general good in relation to the regulation of insurance activities
in general and insurance products in particular’ [ibid, p 152]. Fundamentally, it
would be necessary to monitor the concept of general good very closely if it was
not to be an Non Tariff Barrier (NTB).
Another area felt to undermine the idea of the creation of an SEM in life
insurance was taxation;
[a] taxation on premiums.
[b] taxation of benefits.
[c] taxation on the insurance companies.
Theoretically, these problems could be overcome by taxing the policy-holder in
terms of residence and taxing the company with regard to where the head office
is situated. However, this was largely academic because tax legislation was
excluded from the third life directive because its inclusion would have
necessitated unanimity instead of a qualified majority4 .
In 1988, it was unclear what would be included in the Third Life Assurance
Directive. What was necessary was dialogue with the insurance industry. When
Pool spoke at a meeting of the Double Century Club with regard to the directive
he contended that
. . . he did not know what was going to be in the directive and that
he was open-minded and listening to the views of the market . . .
he feels that research is required to identify the legal framework or
frameworks existing in each Member State . . . and he has asked the
CEA to study the position [Cited by O’Leary, 1988; pp 4-5].
However, at a later date Pool pointed out some fundamental problems in the
pursuit of a SEM in life insurance. ‘One such pair of apparently incompatible
goals is the desire for increased competition coupled with greater consumer
protection’ [Pool, 1990; p 9].
Indeed, market forces alone are seldom perceived as the most satisfactory
solution. However, the problem is, controls both reduce competition and create
protectionism. ‘It is also true, however, that different perceptions of public
interest and different degrees of State intervention produce a situation in which
mutual recognition . . . is hard to attain’ [ibid, p 10]. Consequently, a degree of
harmonisation was necessary to bring separate Member State industries into the
same legislative realm. Pool, felt that there was a growing view in some Member
States ‘. . . that some of the tight controls exercised in the past had been too
restrictive of competition and of little practical use in protecting the public
interest’ [ibid].
‘In the UK there is considerable opposition to any illiberal restrictions. In the
continental countries there is a great fear of the UK as competitors and a, genuine
if misguided, belief that strict supervision is the only effective method of
consumer protection [ibid, p 6]. Ultimately, it was considered that there was ‘. . .
the need for a high degree of harmonisation’ [ibid]. The interests of the UK lay
with a free liberal regime and the British Insurers International Committee
[BIIC], the negotiating arm of the Association of British Insurers [ABI], with
regard to Europe, pushed for this position to be adopted. However, other
Member States also pursued their ideal solution.
The problem, of course, was to enable a single market in life insurance through
the harmonisation of the legislation on which the regulations were to be based.
In insurance the existing national markets differ significantly in the
nature and amount of regulation. They also differ in the nature and
variety of products that can be offered. The problem we confront is
therefore how to reconcile the objective of liberalising the markets,
and of offering the consumers as wide a range of choice as possible
with that of satisfying the authorities in all Member States that
there is adequate protection for the policy-holder and third parties
[Fitchew, 1988; p 1].
Gale [1988] emphasised the role of Bureau International des Producteurs
D’Assurances et de Réassurances [BIPAR] in the creation of legislation and the
extent to which this organisation interacts with the Commission. He indicated
that the treaties have supremacy over national law and that Member States
cannot be part of the club and disobey the rules. ‘Suffice it to say that as a result
of representations made by me and my BIPAR Common Market Committee,
Directorate-Generale XV [DG XV] will be mounting a concerted exercise, initially
of persuasion, to establish a more level legislative playing field . . .’ [ibid p 7].
Primacy of EU law, for Gale, should benefit the whole of the EU ‘. . . since it
must result in the rapprochement of our diverse legal systems which will
eliminate many doubts and disparities which currently bedevil us, particularly
at the commercial level’ [ibid]. Indeed, Gale pointed out the supranational aspect
of the EU in that it negotiates on behalf of the Union at the international level e.g.
GATT now the World Trade Organisation [WTO]. Given the importance of the
negotiations to the insurance industry, he [Gale] had regular contact with those
in the Commission that were responsible for negotiations. Ultimately, as Deputy
Secretary of BIPAR, Gale looked to the interests of his membership who through
interest group membership ensured that their interests were on the table. ‘1992
equals opportunity . . . but only if you understand exactly what you are doing
and are well aware of the details of the environment in which you will be
operating . . .’ [ibid]. In this context, each industry will be pursuing legislation as
near to their own as is feasibly possible given the remit of the Treaty. Therefore,
each Member State should be involved in the creation of each directive to ensure
their advantage in the embryonic SEM.
This had become much clearer by 1990 and was illustrated by the extent to
which interest groups were involved in the European decision-making process.
It was accepted that the industry could learn from itself as the CEA, and other
European insurance interest groups, were invited by the Commission to give
their views. And where the European insurance industry as a whole was
supportive of the opinions expressed by the Commission, one had a strong
suspicion that they would shape the outcome.
INTEREST GROUPS, THE COMMISSION AND THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
This section of the paper will overview the interactions between the interest
groups the Commission and the European Parliament [the supranational
institutions]. ‘A major problem for groups is the unpredictability of the EC
policy-agenda . . . Keeping track of EC policy initiatives is therefore a major
undertaking for groups’ [Mazey and Richardson, 1993; p 206]. For instance,
changes may be brought about because of European Summit decisions or
because of different political agendas that certain Member States may have.
Indeed, the Commission’s policy agenda is also unpredictable because of its
make-up or its compartmentalisation into Directorate Generals [DGs]. In the
national sphere, interest groups face similar difficulties to those indicated above.
However, the difference is of degree and the difficulties incorporated in dealing
with [now fifteen] Member States’ inputs to the policy process and its openness
and size [it is relatively small and lacks expertise and technical knowledge
regarding all Member States]. ‘It is therefore reliant upon external evidence from
groups or experts . . . the desire on the part of Commission officials is to consult
as wide a range of groups as possible, means that it is virtually impossible for
any single interest or national association to secure exclusive access to the
relevant officials’ [ibid, p 209]. Interest groups provide information for the
Commission and give an overall picture in this instance [a compromised view] of
the most amenable regulatory structure for European life insurance industry.
Only European interest groups can do this as only they are able to have even a
marginal inkling of what the majority wish to pursue.
Leon Brittan outlined the Commission’s position at a CEA meeting in November
1989. He contended that there were two broad objectives: firstly, policy-holder
protection in terms of the products offered and the financial position of the
insurance undertaking; and secondly, ensuring the maximum flexibility of
product in terms of nature, price and service. This should allow the policy-
holder a wide choice of products at competitive prices. The problem was that
most Member States considered that this was exactly what their regulatory
regime achieved. Obviously, this agreement hides underlying discord with
regard to the means applied by the separate Member States. The problem
reflected the historical and cultural differences within the Member states. In
general, there are two broad approaches; the liberal approach and the prescribed
approach. The UK, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Eire illustrate gradients of the
former and the other eight Member States tend towards the latter [with Italy,
France, Greece and Portugal indicating different gradients of state-control].
These differences of opinion can be identified in the overall stance of the CEA
and become explicit in the negotiation processes. Obviously, the more different
viewpoints, the greater the difficulties for the Commission in its task of creating
a system which is both agreeable to them and allows mutual recognition of the
different systems. Consequently, agreement has to be reached at the industry
level through the CEA and this agreement needs to be compromised with
Commission objectives. Effectively, the European insurance industry along with
the Commission and Parliament is looking for agreements and compromises that
will carry a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers.
Initially, a broad framework was proposed by the Commission; then through the
CEA, the European life insurance industry responded [this was the collective
opinion of twelve Member State industries].
The Commission concentrated on three areas: a single licence, home country
control and the abolition of prior approval of premium rates and conditions.
Additionally, technical provisions needed to be standardised. The CEA’s
response to this came under five areas.
[a] Assets
[b] Reserves
[c] Premium rating
[d] Policy conditions
[e] Supervision
The non-life insurance directive enabled the framework for CEA discussions in
the  area of assets. Agreement was close to unanimous on a majority of important
issues.
In terms of supervision, some Member States considered that an environment
with a proponent of supervision would be best for the SEM. This would mean
the Member State authorities stipulating a maximum technical interest rate
which, following consultation with the EU, would be fixed by the supervisors.
The more liberal states, including the UK, thought that this was too rigid and
that a more flexible system, that gave more of a role to the company and
actuarial judgement would allow local economies to be taken into consideration.
This problem needed to be overcome if mutual recognition was to be realised,
and all Member States were to feel that the supervisory provisions throughout
the EU gave adequate security. This area proved a sticking point and much
negotiation was necessary. On other matters concerning reserves, the Member
States were unanimous, e.g. no need for a European mortality table, or local
regulation of tables.
In the area of premium rates, once again, there were differences of opinion. In a
number of Member States it was the practice to apply the same technical rate to
both premiums and technical reserves with the supervisors placing ceilings on
the rates that can be adopted. In the more liberally regulated countries, such was
not the case; companies were free to fix premium rates, subject to prudent
mathematical reserves, as there was no need for the rates used to calculate
premiums and mathematical reserves to be the same.
The more regulated Member States wanted the supervisory authorities to
continue determining policy conditions and in some instances the host Member
State should be allowed to intervene and have some say in policies sold in their
own Member State. Whereas, on the other hand, the UK wished to minimise
legislative interference in the regulatory process; this implies minimum host
country control and intervention. The CEA fully supported the abolition of prior
approval for contractual conditions and rates as outlined by the third framework
directive and its replacement by a system of notification [CEA, 1990]. The CEA
considered that under a system of single licence it becomes the responsibility of
the authorities in the  Member State where the head office is to supervise its
activities.
The basic principle sought by the Commission was one where policies would be
written under the regulations of the country of risk or normal country of
residence. However, with regard to life insurance one is dealing with long- term
contracts which may be taken out in different periods and will co-exist.
Consequently, it was acknowledged that individuals should be able to take out
contracts in line with their own Member State regulation even though they had
changed their residence. It was agreed that profit sharing should be left to the
company as this would enhance competition. However, the CEA did note that
there was a minority that considered a more prescribed attitude in this context;
in that profit-sharing should be co-ordinated for long-term contracts.
With regard to supervision, the majority of Member States considered that the
host Member State should have a part in the determination of contracts to be sold
in their territory. They thought that unless they  could control contracts they
would be unable to protect policy-holders. The UK, of course, did not share this
viewpoint. However, the majority agreed terms which allowed supervisory co-
operation so host countries could be aware of products being sold in their
Member States. With regard to business rules it was agreed that the host Member
States would take responsibility.
During the CEA discussions, it was evident that the UK contended that the
continental system in general was too restrictive and anti-competitive. The main
difficulties revolved around:
[a] Prior approval of policies versus post notification checking.
[c] The maximum reserving rate of interest.
[d] The control of premium interest rate assumptions.
In these cases, the arguments centred on liberal [free market] and prescribed
[regulatory intervention] attitudes. The UK and its supporters pursued the more
liberal objectives and the Germans and French, along with their supporters, a
system of prescription and intervention. The creation of the insurance directives
in general and the third life directive in particular should not indicate winners
and losers, but one where all Member States give and take to maximise their own
and the consumers’ positions within the newly evolving market.  This is where
the interest groups come into play: they are consulted on the proposed
legislation and forward changes to the Commission. They are a pivotal entity
with regard to the decision-making institutions and the insurance industry [for
further see, CEA Working Papers, 1990].
Through an interaction with the life insurance industry, the Commission had
been attempting to ‘. . . lay down rules for the exercise of cross-frontier life
assurance, balancing the needs of freedom to provide services and consumer
protection and thereby developing the internal market in life assurance’
[Commission Report, 1992; p 43]. This was illustrated in the negotiations that
enable the third life directive and the accepted need for ‘. . . the co-ordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance’
in the SEM [ibid, p 46].
The treaties outline the necessity of a single market in insurance if a true SEM is
to be realised. Indeed, as early as 1957 the treaties emphasise that its objective
was to create an internal market in the then European Community. This objective
was outlined by Articles 52-59. These indicate the freedom of establishment and
freedom of services.
In its proposal for the third life insurance directive, the Commission contended
that the
. . . completion of the internal market in insurance represents a
primary goal of the Commission in view of the importance of this
strongly expanding sector, particularly in life assurance, and the
work already carried out in other financial services fields with
regard to the creation of a single financial market [European
Parliament Working Paper, 1992; pp 25-26].
Effectively, the Commission considered that the
. . . European financial common market is an essential part of the
frontier-free single European market, and encompasses not only
the free movement of money and capital for all citizens but also
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide cross-border
services for brokers and financial undertakings. If the Community
succeeds. . . . Banks and insurance companies will be free to offer
their financial products without restrictions . . . in all Community
countries [European Documentation, 1989; p 5].
Thus the financial common market was a cornerstone of the SEM programme.
Financial markets and particularly the life insurance market are highly
regulated.  One reason is to protect clients against institutional failure. Another is
to protect the individual in relation to the life insurance company. However, ‘. . .
sharing the same objectives does not mean that these are obtained by the same
means and you will be aware that insurance legislation differs from country to
country’ [Drabbe, 1994; p 135]5.
The very specific nature of financial services is a . . . reason for
particular difficulties in the integration of financial markets. In
contrast to trade in goods, insurance and banking services in the
individual Member States are strongly influenced by varying
traditions of company supervision and investor and consumer
protection [European Document, 1989; p 6].
‘With regard to whether an SEM in life insurance is attainable the answer is yes.
Even without the harmonisation of contract legislation the legal framework
created by the directives gives the industry the opportunities to realise it in
practice’ [Drabbe, p 141]. The EU has set up a Community filter to enable the
protection of consumers on the one hand and competition on the other. The
Community filter encompasses the need for restrictive practices not only to
adhere to the general good but additionally to two further criteria. ‘Firstly, there
should be no duplication of Member State rules or controls. And secondly, the
same protection cannot be met through less restrictions. Basically it needs to
meet a proportionality test’ [ibid, pp 139-140]. However, Drabbe points out that
the difference in ‘. . . tax treatment of insurance products clearly raises major
difficulties for a proper functioning of the single market [ibid, p 141]. If life
insurance products can only be sold in a Member State if it ‘qualifies’; i.e. it
ensures that policy-holders benefit from a favourable tax treatment, ‘. . . the tax
regime effectively determines policy conditions and the marketability of
assurance products. These have to be geared to the different tax requirements of
each Member State . . . this is an infringement of the fundamental Treaty
principles of free movement of persons and the free provision of services’ [ibid].
Indeed, harmonisation of tax bases and levels could overcome the problem [in
principle at least]. However, with taxation closely tied to the concept of
sovereignty, in the short term, it is unlikely that Member States would clamour
to take this road. Yet it does point in the direction of closer ties in the area of
financial services. Initially, one may consider pragmatic solutions, where ‘. . .
harmonisation is not a realistic option, a pragmatic answer could possibly be
provided by ensuring that the tax authorities concerned receive the information
necessary to draw up the tax form and collect the tax due’ [ibid]. However,
further talks are still underway in this area.
By 1992, the specifics of the Third Life Assurance Directive were generally
understood. Some considered it to be a ‘cultural revolution’ [Loheac, 1992; p 2].
The Third Life Assurance Directive removed ‘. . . a priori control of policy and
rating conditions and replaces it with a non-systematic a posteriori
communication system; this means that a long continental tradition of material
control is abandoned and the essence of - which is attributed to the authorities of
the countries office - no longer focuses on the products . . . but the undertaking
itself, its solvency, its shareholding and its management’ [ibid, p 3]. This should
maximise competition in terms of products and increase innovation. However,
there is a problem in terms of the ‘general good’ where Member State
supervisory authorities may outlaw a product if it is deemed risky. Obviously,
this allows Member States with more prescriptive regulatory structures a
modicum of protection.
In general terms, the directive outlined a compromised agreement which once in
place relies on the concept of mutual recognition [given the concept of the
general good]. Once harmonisation has taken place, a form of confrontation will
take place and ‘. . . this confrontation with regulations should result in the
different national rules being brought into line with each other: states which
have a tradition of strict control will have to ease their regulatory constraints if
they want to avoid penalising their own national undertakings . . . In the final
analysis, the logical consequence would be that a less strict system of control
would, in time, set the European standard’ [ibid].
This, of course, could only occur following an initial period of harmonisation or
re-regulation. Indeed, the Commission saw the creation of the SEM as being
pursued through three fundamental means; minimum harmonisation, mutual
recognition6 and home country control
Basically, in each specific sector there needs to be agreement on basic rules and
these minimum harmonisations are only possible because’. . . common interest,
mutual confidence and a degree of economic convergence exist between EEC
Member States’ [ibid, p 409]. It is on the agreement of this basic legislation that
mutual recognition relies.
The liberalisation of the system should suit the UK life insurance industry and
Loheac is correct when he noted that ‘. . . for British operators, an integrated
European insurance market functioning on the basis of rules similar to the model
they are used to . . . should be a favourable environment’ [Loheac, 1992; p 4].
However, although this may be the case, the UK would also need to make
changes to its supervisory structure and the lack of contract legislation may
negate any advantage. Finally, it was recognised that it was ‘. . . essential to
overcome . . . differences in legal systems and regulations in individual Member
States in order to create an integrated European insurance market’ [ibid].
CONCLUSION
This paper has presented an overview of the interplay between the life insurance
industry and the supranational aspects of the EU decision-making institutions.
The most fundamental problem is the absence of a single decision-making body
and that twelve [now fifteen] Member States have to be dealt with in the creation
of policies. Those interest groups that are involved in the policy-making process
as representatives of an industry/sector are a means of overcoming this.
However, the paper also recognises that interest groups, should take care not to
neglect the national dimension of lobbying since the final decisions on policies
are taken not by a directly elected European government, but by national
officials and ministers.
The evidence suggests that the insurance industry relies heavily on European-
wide interest groups and the notion of collective action. Indeed, this paper
considers that the less concentrated a sector, the less difficulty it has in
overcoming the problem of collective action. For instance, the automobile,
biotechnological and consumer electronics sectors interest groups have been
relatively weak, whereas in the pharmaceutical and insurance sectors interest
groups have greater influence (Camerra-Rowe, 1996; Greenwood et al 1992;
McLauchlin, et al 1993; McLauchlin and Greenwood, 1995; McLaughlin, 1995).
The EU is  evolutionary as are its institutions and this is illustrated by the
uncertainty regarding relations between interest groups and the EU. Camerra-
Rowe (1996) considers that it is unlikely that interest groups will be the prime
movers in interest representation in the EU. That the “. . . initiatives the
Commission and other EU institutions undertake to regulate interest groups will
be critical in determining the future form and shape that business representation
takes. . . . In short, effective collective action may originate not from the desire of
firms in these sectors to speak with a common voice on common interests, but
from the desire of EU officials to create common collective interests from a
multitude of private ones” (p 23).
The institutional interplay provides an illustration of how a harmonisation
process is at work between the Member States and how the Third Life Assurance
Directive was formulated. Each institution attempts to prioritise its
understanding of what type of legislation should exist for the evolving SEM.
The paper has identified interactions between industries/sectors and political
institutions in the decision-making process at the EU level. This provides an
example of supranationalism in the European integration process. Overall,
through the interaction between interest groups and the EU certainty and clarity
are provided. The ground rules are indicated and the parameters of policy
formulated. However, the EU institutions are still developing, consequently the
interest group system surrounding it has yet to reach a stable equilibrium. The
EU is still in the early stages of interest group use and adjusting to
supranationality, it is therefore not surprising that the process of interest group
intermediation is in the process of modification.
NOTES
1 Supranationality may be defined as ". . . neither federalism nor intimate intergovernmental co-operation,
even though the institutions it employs resemble those of a federation more than the United Nations or
NATO. Supranationality is a unique style of making international decisions, unique because of the nature
of the participants, the context in which decisions are made and the quality of decisions produced (Haas,
1964; p 64).
2 O'Leary was the representative of the British Insurers International Committee (BIIC).
3 Article 25 contains a marketing rule for insurance products . . . to the single case of contracts in conflict
with legal provisions protecting the general good in the Member State in which the risk is situated. The
concept of general good . . . must be understood in the light of . . . derogations to freedom laid down by
the EEC Treaty (which) are only allowed where there exists in the area considered, mandatory reasons
linked to the general good, consumer protection rule providing that this interest is not already safeguarded
by rules to which the undertaking is subject in the Member State in which it has its head office . . . and
providing that the same result cannot be obtained by less stringent rules” (CEA Working Paper, 1990; p 2
author’s brackets. For further details on this see ECJ’s decision case no 205/84, in particular recitals nos 27-
29).
4  Tax issues are still impeding the development of a single market for insured and non-insured pensions
in the EU. Barriers have only been partially removed “. . . some member states allow tax deductibility of
premium only on insurance contracts bought from domiciled insurers, meaning that non-domiciled
insurers cannot compete on a level playing field” (Shapiro, 1997; p 23).
5 Humbert Drabbe was head of the team that drew up the Third Life Assurance Directive. He was a key
figure in DG XV.
6 Mutual recognition encapsulates an important mechanism in the pursuit of the SEM as it gives a
framework for the enablement of compromise. However, where diversity is so great, there will be a need
for greater rather than less harmonisation of Member State legislation. The  principle of mutual
recognition. . . pre-supposes agreement on a number of basic rules. . . these minimum harmonisation
requirements. . . are only possible because common interest, mutual confidence and a high degree of
economic convergence exist between EEC member states (Loheac, 1991; p 409). One has to question if
"minimum harmonisation requirements" have been met in respect of the life insurance market. The
achievement of such requirements is extremely rare and even if there is a "high degree of economic
convergence" in the life insurance market, the practical realities of achieving an SEM through mutual
recognition alone are apparent. A convergence process must be undertaken prior to the actions of mutual
recognition coming into play (ibid). The idea behind mutual recognition suggests spontaneous legislative
adaptation; however, it does not deal with all regulation and as a convergence point is necessary for it to
be effective it could be conceived as an impetus that encourages legislative change and compromise.
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